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## CRIMINOLOGY

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To bridge real and perceived divides between central Mindanao and the island provinces, the interim government should fund more development projects with a particular focus on health, energy and infrastructure in Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. What should be done? The Bangsamoro government should strengthen efforts to pass legislation protecting the Lumad, spread development projects more evenly across the region, and resolve local conflicts between Moro and indigenous communities. In its three years, the legislature has passed 200 resolutions. Many of these reflect lawmakers' sensitivity to issues related to inclusivity, including condemnation of several cases of gender-based violence, advocacy for rehabilitating the city of Marawi, which was damaged in battles with Islamist militants in 2017, and concern for the poor, people with disabilities, orphans and widows. But indigenous peoples' issues have fared less well. Flare-ups of violence also continue to occur, notwithstanding the overall decline of armed conflict in the region. Research also drew on various documents and records issued by the interim government, as well as recent academic literature and important contributions from a local researcher. Scions of the Bangsamoro's influential clans should also participate. In other respects, however, progress appears to have stalled. First, several major groups live in central Mindanao, namely the Maguindanaos, Maranaos and Iranun, with the former two making up most of the BARM's population. Secondly, the Tausug, Yakan and Sama live in the Sulu archipelago, south west of Mindanao Island. Thirdly, other ethno-linguistic Moro groups live outside the BARM, such as the Sangli and Kalagan in the Davao region and the 80-member legislative body, but also actively participated in conflict. And after more than a two-year lull, the normalisation process resumed with a third phase of decommissioning of MILF ex-combatants kicking off in late 2021. The interim government should redouble efforts to ensure that the benefits of development projects are well distributed geographically. But while the peace process has put an end to open war in the Bangsamoro, the transition remains a work in progress, with many challenges. Field commanders could also use their kinship networks and related forms of soft power to deter non-MILF armed actors from violence. The BARM's population includes thirteen distinct Islamised communities alongside ethno-religious minorities, such as non-Moro indigenous peoples (also known as Lumad) and Christians. Indeed, the interim government can use the extra time to expand the gains achieved so far and to cultivate broader support among the population. A major challenge for the interim government has been to deliver much-needed public services across the poverty-stricken region and promote governance for all of Bangsamoro's residents. The Bangsamoro's multi-ethnic character and political complexity suggest that any arrangement to achieve durable peace and stability will benefit by meeting certain criteria for inclusiveness. For one, skirmishes between government forces and militant groups that continue to operate across the region periodically cause havoc, repeatedly displacing many residents. Then there are recurrent local conflicts, which take on three major forms: first, clan feuds between and among families, also known as *rido* or *pagbanta*; secondly, political disputes, often caused by electoral competition; and thirdly, fighting between Moros and indigenous groups. Regional disparities remain, particularly along the central Mindanao-Sulu archipelago fault line. There are three broad clusters of Moro Muslims, spread over three different geographic areas. The region's thirteen Islamised ethno-linguistic groups distinguish themselves from one another through customs, traditions and languages. Manila's decision to extend the interim government's term for three years past its original deadline, until mid-2025, provides a welcome opportunity for the transitional authority to work with local and outside actors toward more inclusive peace and some occasions, critics also blame the interim government's conflicting policy priorities and a tendency to improvise rather than plan long-term. A mayor from Basilan province said: "If the interim authorities have been there for more than two years but still have no tangible impact". Meanwhile, BARM's new parliamentary system, while clearly an improvement over its precursor in terms of legislative output, remains unfamiliar to locals. It should also pass the indigenous peoples' code, to safeguard indigenous rights and make clear that the government is attentive to Lumad concerns even as the parties continue to work through difficult issues relating to land claims. A case in point is recurrent tension in South Upi, where political and economic triggers regularly tip decades-old disputes into armed confrontation. To begin with, the BARM's ministries and agencies remain understaffed, though the slow pace of recruitment is partly due to the pandemic slowing down the already complicated procedure. Perhaps worse, implementation of development projects has fallen behind schedule. Its ministries and agencies are in place, and the parliament has passed three of the seven legal codes called for in the Organic Law and prioritised in the transition plan that the MILF prepared shortly before the BARM was created – those dealing with education, administration and the civil service. The ex-rebels demonstrated their capacity to govern effectively by undertaking COVID-19 relief operations across the region with reasonable success. They have also pursued a series of governance reforms, such as allocating funding to several municipalities in the region that had never received state subsidies before. Although the region remains the Philippines' poorest, its poverty incidence dropped by 16.5 per cent in 2021, with particular improvements in Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao. Stronger engagement with, and funding for, local organisations could reinforce efforts to strengthen Bangsamoro institutions and governance. In some cases, donors may be able to find additional resources for these activities in existing peacebuilding portfolios designed to support the transition. The extension of the transition period until 2025 could, in that regard, be a blessing in disguise. Secondly, the bulk of socio-economic and security interventions occur in central Mindanao, where the six recognised MILF camps are located in the provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which also host thousands of fighters. While failure to deliver the promised socio-economic packages following disarmament risks frustrating guerrillas, in the islands, such a scenario could drive them toward the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group (a network of criminal and militant cells operating in the Sulu archipelago) and lead to violence and crime. Why does it matter? The Bangsamoro is an ethno-religious mosaic, comprising various Muslim Moro groups, Christians and indigenous peoples known as Lumads. Such a platform would also allow for informal conversations among future regional policymakers, helping bridge the divides that persist in the newly autonomous region. Differences between the Bangsamoro sub-regions continue to shape the region's political life. Women's exclusion "will not lead to rebellion", but it would undermine the "quality of peace", as an observer of the peace process said – leaving women who played key roles during the Bangsamoro struggle prone to grievance and a sense of injustice. Described as inclusive in "spirit and intent", the law outlined the contours of Moro autonomy and led to the BARM's inauguration in 2019. In a region as diverse and fractured as the Bangsamoro, building institutions that properly represent and cater equally to all of these groups is bound to be difficult. As a senior female cadre said: "I am pleading and asking my Bangsamoro sisters to learn and not to rely on men [in the MILF's military wing]". Wives of ex-combatants have started lobbying for better implementation of the normalisation process, as for example in Sapa-Sapa town in Tawi-Tawi. Other ex-rebel women have engaged with civil society in trainings or worked together, with some success, in economic cooperatives. More broadly, MILF women in the parliament or BARM bureaucracy have exerted efforts to assist decommissioned and active women cadres, for example through livelihood support during the pandemic, information sharing or scholarships. Local violence tends to affect women in specific

villages, categorise them according to complexity and begin working through the least difficult first. Declaring the ancestral domains in Maguindanao, which would give the indigenous peoples the foremost right to land ownership and use through land titles, is not realistic in the short term, as it would clash with legitimate Moro land claims. A more promising near-term option is to safeguard indigenous rights through legislation that offers formal legal recognition of non-Moro indigenous identity in the region. It can work to equitably distribute peace dividends among all the people of the Bangsamoro, for example, and keep developing policies that support women’s and minorities’ participation in civic and political life. Relevant interim government ministries will also need to take more concerted action to bring fighting to an end. While the Organic Law officially acceded to that demand, many indigenous communities, such as the Teduray, are still concerned about their future in the BARMM, demanding recognition of non-Moro indigenous identity that goes beyond formal assurances, including through legislation. Another central demand focuses on the need to respect the practice of collective ownership of land known as ancestral domain. The region’s nascent institutions, bureaucratic machinery and legislation are also getting into shape. While women form an active part of the Moro rebel movement, the male-dominated nature of normalisation bodies and processes has meant that their perspectives have at times been neglected. Should it do so, it should work together with the MILF leadership to increase the proportion of female and indigenous representatives and nominate parliamentarians from smaller Moro ethno-linguistic groups. It could address the issue by outlining ownership of contested land, developing clear roadmaps to resolve the conflicting claims and ensuring comprehensive buy-in through consultations with Christian, Moro and indigenous leaders. Deadly conflict in the Bangsamoro has considerably decreased since the autonomous region came into being, but flare-ups still occur. For their part, indigenous leaders should address their grievances non-violently, for example by continuing to register these in outreach to Bangsamoro authorities and documenting human rights abuses or other actions against them or their property. Local civil society, including women’s organisations, could also contribute to conflict resolution initiatives, particularly as they have a track record in managing community-based conflict in South Upi. The MILF, which is strongest in central Mindanao, mostly comprises Iranun, Maguindanaon and Maranao fighters. The Tausug, on the other hand, dominate the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the first Moro rebel movement, which has a strong presence in the islands. With the interim government’s term now extended for another three years, selecting the next set of Bangsamoro parliamentarians could also provide a welcome opportunity to reintegrate inclusive governance. As for local peacebuilding efforts, Bangsamoro women often play an active role, participating alongside men in efforts to defuse community conflicts and limit violence. Traditionally, for example, Maranao women from royalty or the political elite have acted as intermediaries or arbiters in clan feuds. There are different views among [women] working on the transition as to whether it is providing sufficient space for women to help shape the new autonomous region. Despite the specificities of women’s experiences and needs amid violence, authorities can sometimes focus primarily or exclusively on men. A few months into the transition, the lawmakers went as far as to issue a resolution that encouraged the national indigenous peoples’ commission to “cease and desist” from land surveys in Maguindanao that could help the Teduray-Lambangian assert their ancestral domain. Even if it was not binding as a matter of law, the resolution raised questions about the ways in which the MILF-led interim government looks at minority rights in the Moro-majority region. The autonomous region is the product of nearly six decades of armed struggle between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Mindanao’s largest rebel group. Two types of organised violence remain prevalent in the Bangsamoro. Those who hold positions are usually either from an “elite” background, have family ties “as daughters or wives” of rebel commanders or politicians, or have proven their loyalty to the MILF before or during the transition. Thirdly, despite many interventions, whether by the women’s commission or individual female members of parliament, it is not clear that women’s voices are reaching “the strategic level” of decision-making, making the true effects of their participation hard to gauge. Insecurity has also driven Teduray villagers to join local communist bands for the sake of protection and access to guns. The new generation would benefit from deeper knowledge of peace efforts and the emerging political order, as it will better prepare them to be effective leaders in the future. help address grievances by giving people in Mindanao an opportunity to benefit more evenly from the anticipated peace dividends. The level of violence in the region is much lower today than it has been for decades, and as the transition gains momentum, peace dividends such as more efficient social or health services are slowly trickling down to the people. At the same time, despite its leading role in the interim government, the MILF is not synonymous with the parliament or the bureaucracy, making it difficult to place either blame or credit for the transition’s twists and turns wholly with them. “We just want to live in peace”, said an indigenous leader. The MILF should press its commanders and rank-and-file members to abstain from violence against indigenous peoples and sanction individuals who instigate or escalate attacks. Some Bangsamoro women say more representation could be “a boost” to visibility and, by extension, more gender-responsive policies. Others remain cautious, arguing that a stronger female presence in parliament would not necessarily lead to women having more influence or producing gender-sensitive policies. The creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in 2019 renewed hopes for peaceful coexistence between communities after decades of war in the southern Philippines. Participation of minorities and women in the transition should be part of efforts to ensure long-term stability, as envisaged by the 2014 peace agreement. The Christians. In a region as diverse and fractured as the Bangsamoro, building institutions that properly represent and cater equally to all these groups is bound to be difficult. “It is mere tolerance, rather than acceptance”, commented a development official working on normalisation. In the past, discontent with unequal distribution of peace dividends has undermined the cohesion of Moro movements to the point of splintering, which in turn fuelled conflict. The indigenous peoples (also known as Lumads). A good place to start might be to map out the competing land claims that are often the source of tension, rank them in order of complexity and begin working through the most straightforward first. In addition, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process has pledged to look into conflicting land claims that could hamper normalisation. But many Tedurays feel there are still no guarantees they will be heard, and some say the MILF, which plays a central role in camp transformation, are prone to adopt what they see as patronising attitudes. What women’s “meaningful political participation” means in practice is still subject to debate in the Bangsamoro. For example, according to available data, while the region’s overall poverty rate decreased in 2021, provincial indicators for development in Sulu and Tawi-Tawi stagnated. Worse is the limited role women are able to play in the transformation of MILF camps. Normalisation not only illustrates the transition’s complexity, but its gaps also reflect Bangsamoro’s fault lines and suggest that the process is less than fully inclusive. Many of the BARMM’s ministers, for example, have their own power bases, political acumen and understanding of what it means “to be inclusive”. The regional government’s inconsistent relations with local governments, meanwhile, stem as much from inherent cracks in the Bangsamoro’s ethno-political setup as from the former rebels’ difficulties in coherently dealing with the clans that dominate the region’s towns and provinces, as witnessed in the extension debate. Interim government officials, who may be experienced technocrats, neophytes or anything in between, also navigate the political transition differently. Historically, liberation movements in the region emphasised “Morohood” by invoking a common past shaped by resistance to colonial conquest, with Islam as the unifier. But regional fissures lingered from the Moro self-determination struggle’s beginnings in the colonial era to the present. The protracted and meandering violence in Mindanao that escalated to a full-blown separatist insurgency in the early 1970s has exacerbated political fragmentation by shaking up traditional sources of authority and diffusing power among the national government, local politicians and insurgents. Thirdly, the ex-rebels must find a way to satisfy their cadres and supporters without alienating the rest of the Bangsamoro in the process. The MILF should encourage its local commanders to refrain from violence and to use their kinship networks to persuade other armed actors to stand down as well. First, it should pass the gender and development code, which requires gender sensitivity in BARMM programming. Pending the code’s passage, BARMM agencies and local government units should use their existing budgets for interventions that promote women’s participation in peace and development programs beyond activities such as cultural events that some see as tokenistic. The MILF, as the party in the driver’s seat of the transition process, is well aware of the need to foster an inclusive transition. While President Duterte appointed the transitional parliament, in the future lawmakers will be elected and they, in turn, will elect the region’s chief minister or top executive. Donors should support the regional authorities and local civil society organisations in working toward these objectives and addressing existing development gaps. Armed groups and powerful political clans also continue to shape the socio-political order in the BARMM’s five provinces, two cities and one special administrative area that together are home to around 4.5 million people. Working with local civil society, including through provision of funding, particularly with organisations focused on indigenous groups and islanders, as well as women leaders, could be another way to support higher levels of civic participation and a richer political life for these people. The office’s creation, while delayed, is a first step for the community to become “more active in governance”. A crucial task for the former rebels in achieving durable peace is to tackle local violence and reduce the potential for conflict flare-ups, especially in or near indigenous communities. Making normalisation more inclusive could ... The BARMM’s ministries – such as those of indigenous peoples’ affairs, of public order and safety, of environment, natural resources and energy – perhaps coming together in a special inter-agency task force, could spearhead these efforts. The interim government should also convene a series of inclusive discussions among the parties to the most protracted local conflicts as the first step toward developing tailored dispute resolution roadmaps for each. In South Upi, for example, it would need to secure the buy-in of local Moro leaders and commanders; indigenous representatives; and Christian political and business interests. Descendants of Catholic and Protestant settlers who migrated to Mindanao from other Philippine islands in previous centuries make up another minority, continue to occur, notwithstanding the overall decline of armed conflict in the region. The Bangsamoro’s new institutions provide various platforms through which minority groups and Bangsamoro women can take part in the transition and influence policies. Donors should also coordinate a comprehensive mapping of development and peacebuilding programs in the Bangsamoro and adjacent areas, to help eliminate redundancy and help ensure that investments are directed everywhere they are most needed. For example, starting in 2016, the UN Development Programme trained a number of Bangsamoro women and men as “insider mediators”, who later became crucial actors in negotiating key provisions of the Organic Law with members of the Philippine Congress. During the last months of 2021, Maguindanaon and indigenous women created their own mediation network in Maguindanao that accompanied the government-MILF ceasefire mechanism when it deployed on the ground in cases of violations. A local NGO led by a woman in Sulu province, Tumikang Sama Sama, has mediated feuds in the province even when the logistics became much more difficult during the pandemic. The label can also refer to Islamised members of the autonomous region’s indigenous communities, though some indigenous groups have either maintained their traditional customs and religion, or embraced Christianity, and prefer to be called “non-Moro indigenous peoples”. Several issues, however, continue to threaten the process. Finally, the Philippine government and the MILF should revive information drives on normalisation in MILF camps and indigenous communities, among other things to avoid false expectations and to promote transparency. They also point out that the MILF is the largest existing cross-regional force, and therefore carries more potential for an inclusive approach than any of the region’s other political actors. Paradoxically, there are also rebels, both men and women, who feel that the organisation’s revolutionary ideals are fading away, leaving them still loyal but disappointed and frustrated. Yet some women who spoke to Crisis Group said they feel “underutilised” by decision-makers, despite advantages that Bangsamoro women peacemakers typically have, such as safe access to conflicting parties during a feud’s early stages (for example via back channels) and the ability to unpack conflict dynamics while being perceived as objective and non-partisan. To the extent that women are sidelined, locals suggest several possible explanations, including lack of awareness of the contributions women can make, the perception that conflict resolution is a man’s job and women’s underrepresentation in formal political positions, which in the Bangsamoro are crucial for bestowing legitimacy on potential mediators. In addition, women indicated that concerns for personal safety sometimes make them hesitant to intervene when violence escalates. The interim government responded with humanitarian measures such as timely relief assistance, but the drivers of violence remain. A major challenge appears to be the interim government’s unwillingness to settle the conflicts in good faith, which would require disciplining MILF members, or followers of other Moro armed groups, and resolving competing land claims once and for all. But several groups, including minorities and women, could be better represented. Donors should keep supporting the interim government’s administrative capacities through trainings and continue dialogue with the BARMM on the importance of women’s political participation. Bangsamoro’s broader war-to-peace transition, commonly referred to as the “normalisation process”, has also been a mixed bag. Before the pandemic, the third-party Independent Decommissioning Body disarmed over 12,000 MILF guerrillas in two phases. From March 2020 onward, however, the process stalled, due to COVID-19 but also because of the MILF’s hesitancy to disarm, given the uncertainty regarding an extension of the transition period at the time and doubts about the central government’s capacity to deliver the socio-economic package it promised to demobilised combatants. The third phase of decommissioning finally resumed in November 2021, once the extension had been announced; it aims to disarm as many as 14,000 more guerrillas in the coming months. Bangsamoro’s cultural and religious diversity means that there is no single, homogeneous set of expectations as to women’s roles. Violence subsided over the course of 2021, but the fragile stalemate is likely to be untenable.

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