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CRIMINOLOGY

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To bridge real and perceived divides between central Mindanao and the island provinces, the interim government should fund more development projects with a particular focus on health, energy and infrastructure in Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. What should be done? The Bangsamoro government should strengthen efforts to pass legislation protecting the Lumad, spread development projects more evenly across the region, and resolve local conflicts between Moro and indigenous communities. In its three years, the legislature has passed 200 resolutions. Many of these reflect lawmakers' sensitivity to issues related to inclusivity, including condemnation of several cases of gender-based violence, advocacy for rehabilitating the city of Marawi, which was damaged in battles with Islamist militants in 2017, and concern for the poor, peoples' issues have fared less well. Flare-ups of violence also continue to occur, notwithstanding the overall decline of armed conflict in the region. Research also drew on various documents and records issued by the interim government, as well as recent academic literature and important contributions from a local researcher. Scions of the Bangsamoro's influential clans should also participate. In other respects, however, progress appears to have stalled. First, several major groups live in central Mindanao, namely the Maguindanaons, Maranaos and Iranun, with the former two making up most of the BARMM's population. Secondly, the Tausug, Yakan and Sama live in the Sangil and Kalagan in the Davao region and Sarangani province, the Kalibugan in the Zamboanga peninsula, and the Jama Mapun, Molbog and Palawani people in the northern part of the Sulu archipelago and neighbouring Palawan province. Many Moros, of all ethnic origins, also live in Philippine metropolitan centres such as Manila, Cebu and Davao. Communal conflicts and clan feuds are often rooted in local conditions, such as competing land claims or political rivalries, that in turn have different effects on various social groups. While the Bangsamoro peace process has made undeniable gains, fostering inclusive peace and governance still faces challenges. But while the parliamentary appointments reflect the Bangsamoro's diversity in some respects, they are less representative in others. Some parliamentarians have expressed to Crisis Group that the body has too few members from smaller Moro groups in the Bangsamoro. Only thirteen parliamentarians are women. With a few exceptions, almost all female lawmakers come from elite families or have served in government; few hail from remote rural areas, where the majority of Bangsamoro women live. Donors should encourage and support such endeavours. ... Why was she not given a voice?" Paradoxically, in cases of gender-based violence, women often choose not to report violations to authorities due to cultural stigma or a perception that "keeping quiet will prevent conflict from escalating". A key accomplishment was the establishment of the Bangsamoro Women Commission in January 2020. Though an ethnic Teduray heads the MILF and overall lack of focus. This stands in contrast to other indigenous peoples, for example in Basilan, who enjoy a positive relationship with the ministry. Apart from the Muslim ethno-linguistic groups, two other communities live in Bangsamoro territory. One fault line lies between central Mindanao - now home to the regional capital - and the Sulu archipelago, on the BARMM's western's fringes. The primary objective of establishing the Bangsamoro parliament was to create a forum where many groups could be represented politically, letting them "compete peacefully without escalation into the battlefield". The appointed transitional parliament includes Christian and indigenous lawmakers, though politicans from the Moro majority dominate the 80-member legislative body. but also actively participated in conflict. And after more than a two-year lull, the normalisation process resumed with a third phase of decommissioning of MILF ex-combatants kicking off in late 2021. The interim government should redouble efforts to ensure that the benefits of development projects are well distributed geographically. But while the peace process has put an end to open war in the Bangsamoro, the transition remains a work in progress, with many challenges. Field commanders could also use their kinship networks and related forms of soft power to deter non-MILF armed actors from violence. The BARMM's population includes thirteen distinct Islamised communities, such as non-Moro indigenous peoples (also known as Lumad) and Christians. Indeed, the interim government can use the extra time to expand the gains achieved so far and to cultivate broader support among the population. A major challenge for the interim government has been to deliver much-needed public services across the poverty-stricken region and promote governance for all of Bangsamoro's multi-ethnic character and political complexity suggest that any arrangement to achieve durable peace and stability will benefit by meeting certain criteria for inclusiveness. For one, skirmishes between and among families, also known as rido or pagbanta; the region periodically cause havoc, repeatedly displacing many residents. Then there are recurrent local conflicts, which take on three major forms: first, clan feuds between and among families, also known as rido or pagbanta; secondly, political disputes, often caused by electoral competition; and thirdly, fighting between Moros and indigenous groups. Regional disparities remain, particularly along the central Mindanao-Sulu archipelago fault line. ethno-linguistic groups distinguish themselves from one another through customs, traditions and languages. Manila's decision to extend the interim government's term for three years past its original deadline, until mid-2025, provides a welcome opportunity for the transitional authority to work with local and outside actors toward more inclusive peace and governance. While COVID-19 is again partly responsible, critics also blame the interim government's conflicting policy priorities and a tendency to improvise rather than plan long-term. A mayor from Basilan province said: "[The interim authorities] have been there for more than two years but still have no tangible impact". Meanwhile BARMM's new parliamentary system, while clearly an improvement over its precursor in terms of legislative output, remains unfamiliar to locals. It should also pass the indigenous peoples' code, to safeguard indigenous rights and make clear that the government is attentive to Lumad concerns even as the parties continue to work through difficult issues relating to land claims. A case in point is recurrent tension in South Upi, where political and economic triggers regularly tip decades-old disputes into armed confrontation. To begin with, the BARMM's ministries and agencies remain understaffed, though the slow pace of recruitment is partly due to the pandemic slowing down the already complicated procedure. Perhaps worse, implementation of development projects has fallen behind schedule. Its ministries and agencies are in place, and the parliament has passed three of the seven legal codes called for in the Organic Law and prioritised in the transition plan that the MILF prepared shortly before the BARMM was created - those dealing with education, administration and the civil service. The ex-rebels demonstrated their capacity to govern effectively by undertaking COVID-19 relief operations across the region with reasonable success. They have also pursued a series of governance reforms, such as allocating funding to several municipalities in the region that had never received state subsidies before. Although the region remains the Philippines' poorest, its poverty incidence dropped by 16.5 per cent in 2021, with particular improvements in Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao. Stronger engagement with, and funding for, local organisations could reinforce efforts to strengthen Bangsamoro institutions and governance. In some cases, donors may be able to find additional resources for these activities in existing peacebuilding portfolios designed to support the transition. The extension of the transition period until 2025 could, in that regard, be a blessing in disguise. Secondly, the bulk of socio-economic and security interventions occur in central Mindanao, where the six recognised MILF camps are located, and not in the provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which also host thousands of fighters. While failure to deliver the promised socio-economic packages following disarmament risks frustrating guerrillas, in the islands, such a scenario could drive them toward the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group (a network of criminal and militant cells operating in the Sulu archipelago) and lead to violence and crime. Why does it matter? The Bangsamoro is an ethno-religious mosaic, comprising various Muslim Moro groups, Christians and indigenous peoples known as Lumads. Such a platform would also allow for informal conversations among future regional policymakers, helping bridge the divides that persist in the newly autonomous region. Differences between the Bangsamoro sub-regions continue to shape the region's political life. Women's exclusion "will not lead to rebellion", but it would undermine the "quality of peace", as an observer of the peace process said – leaving women who played key roles during the Bangsamoro struggle prone to grievance and a sense of injustice. Described as inclusive in "spirit and intent", the law outlined the contours of Moro autonomy and led to the BARMM's inauguration in 2019. In a region as diverse and fractured as the Bangsamoro, building institutions that properly represent and cater equally to all these groups is bound to be difficult. As a senior female cadre said: "I am pleading and asking my Bangsamoro sisters to learn and not to rely on men in [the MILF's military wing]". Wives of ex-combatants have started lobbying for better implementation of the normalisation process, as for example in Sapa-Sapa town in Tawi-Tawi. Other ex-rebel women have engaged with civil society in trainings or worked together, with some success, in economic cooperatives. More broadly, MILF women in the parliament or BARMM bureaucracy have exerted efforts to assist decommissioned and active women cadres, for example through livelihood support during the pandemic, information sharing or scholarships. Local violence tends to affect women in specific ways. Women and girls displaced by conflict, whether hosted by relatives or living in shelters, carry the double burden of having to take care of their families and support their families an as part of clan wars. On some occasions, women interlocutors said, the "way of the gun" has taken such hold in society that men use violence not only against one another but also against women. For example, South Upi, which has been particularly affected by conflict, is also one of the BARMM towns with the highest rates of recorded gender-based violence, including domestic abuse. Given the Bangsamoro's ethno-linguistic diversity and the myriad ways conflict has affected people living in the southern Philippines, the peace process aims to deliver durable peace and development to all the region's residents, irrespective of ethno-religious identity and gender. Passage of the long-awaited indigenous peoples' code, which, among other things, would offer this recognition, should be a top priority. The ex-rebels of the MILF head an interim government, known as the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), that has both legislative and executive functions. Finally, both the Philippine government and international donors can support the Bangsamoro on its path to more inclusive institutions and governance. Giving the Bangsamoro Women's Commission a chance to participate in meetings and workshops on normalisation could also help spread awareness. For example, many advocates for women's rights, including indigenous women, credit the BARMM and its ministries with involving women from outside government in consultations on legislation. On the other hand, there are also people within or close to the BARMM who are critical of the interim government's efforts to strengthen participation, characterising them as "ceremonial" or "tokenistic". Local civil society, including women's organisations, could also contribute to conflict resolution initiatives. While most members of this traditional aristocracy do not wield power per se, they can still be important in resolving locals and supporters of the peace process that the national government is overly focused on disarming the MILF rebels, at the expense of other crucial elements of normalisation, including the need to transform rebel camps into "productive communities". These critics sometimes point to the promote women's welfare in the Bangsamoro. Among other tasks, it has trained women's grassroots organisations on livelihood skills and peacebuilding, started training BARMM staff on budgeting that takes into account the gender-differentiated needs of the female population, and campaigned to end the practice of child marriage. The commission, with technical support from international partners, has also crafted a Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. This document aims to support women during conflict by encouraging gender-sensitive humanitarian responses, for example through "comprehensive" health packages and promoting linkages between community groups and civil society. In the words of Chief Minister Ebrahim, it "should serve as a guide for all planners and implementers". As a high-ranking rebel commander told Crisis Group: "BARMM is not for the MILF. The term "Bangsamoro" has different meanings. First, the indigenous peoples' code, a law that should ensure Lumads' rights and recognise non-Moro indigenous identity, has been in limbo for two years. Secondly, some allege that the ministry of indigenous peoples' affairs itself is not living up to expectations. Kinship and class further feed into the Bangsamoro's social complexity. Women's voices are far from uniform, of course, and there are different views among those working on the transition as to whether it is providing sufficient space for women to help shape the new autonomous region. Lastly, while women form an active part of the Moro rebel movement, the male-dominated nature of normalisation will been neglected. An important way to achieve inclusive political representation will be the BARMM's parliamentary form of government, a novelty in the Philippines. ... It is for everyone: Muslims, Christians and indigenous peoples". The interim government's concept of "moral government's concept of "moral government's concept of "moral government". previous reporting on Mindanao, this report examines the interim government's efforts in achieving inclusivity. Research, conducted between November 2021 and January 2022, included fieldwork in Mindanao and interviews with interim regional and national government officials, MILF commanders and combatants, indigenous leaders, local politicians, development officials, international observers, non-governmental organisation employees, and female civil society leaders and activists. Some MILF women, however, also navigate the transition's occasional uncertainty with an aspiration for self-reliance. Regional disparities remain, clan feuds and uneasy relations between Moro and indigenous communities in Maguindanao linger, and the normalisation process is behind schedule. Should Manila opt to appoint new officials instead of extending additional women and members of smaller Moro communities. In addition, the new parliament could have at least one more seat for indigenous peoples and include a representative from each of Mindanao's displaced population and the MILF's women auxiliary brigade. In its first three years, the interim government, led by Chief Minister and MILF Chairman Ahod Balawag "Al-Haj Murad" Ebrahim, may have had an imperfect record, but it has undeniably made headway in leading the war-scarred region toward a more peaceful era. A woman from the MILF's social welfare committee said of the MILF's social welfare committee while governing a diverse and divided region presents a dilemma for the former insurgents. First, funding constraints still affect the government's ability to deliver the promised socio-economic packages for ex-combatants. Secondly, a vital component of normalisation, the transformation of former MILF camps into "peaceful and productive communities", has run into difficulties as some programs failed to take off despite an existing funding mechanism. Thirdly, other normalisation a justice, are lagging. National government of ficials are optimistic that normalisation will speed up in 2022, but critics from civil society are more cautious, given the history of delays and the forthcoming presidential election. Most normalisation mechanisms, including disarmament, are in the hands of men - MILF commanders and senior government officials. Although trained in combat, the movement's women cadres, enrolled in the Bangsamoro Women's Auxiliary Brigade, have traditionally played medical and logistical roles in guerrilla camps. As a result, they are much less involved in decommissioning, something that female MILF members seem to accept, though high-ranking women say the actual number of cadres is higher than just the few hundred fighters that some estimates cite. To advance the "meaningful participation" of women and girls in civic and political life, it should pass legislation that requires gender sensitivity in government programming. From the start, Mindanao's peace process was rather innovative in emphasising the need for inclusivity, be it in terms of respecting ethnic and religious minorities' rights or ensuring women's active participation. Observers have lauded the 2014 peace agreement as being generally sensitive to gender issues: women were present at the negotiation table and the final texts promised Bangsamoro women a stronger voice in regional politics and economic development. The Organic Law, which enabled the region's autonomy, then defined Bangsamoro identity broadly, encompassing both Islamised ethno-linguistic groups and those who are not Muslim but still identify as Bangsamoro. It also gave indigenous peoples the freedom to "retain their distinct indigenous and ethnic identity" and aimed to "ensure" the rights of Bangsamoro's Christians, reflecting the region's demographic complexity. There are five non-Moro indigenous groups in the BARMM, the largest of which is the Teduray-Lambangian in Maguindanao. Some of these groups, which insist on a unique political identity, have a fraught history with Moro Muslims. Supportive of the peace process, as they felt caught in the crossfire between Moro rebels and the state several indigenous groups expressed fear of being ostracised once Moro autonomy became a reality, leading them to lobby hard for recognition as a distinct group. Involving these young clan representatives could help address a gap that civil society figures and observers identified earlier in the peace process, whereby clans and youth did not actively shape political discourse. Major fault lines lie between provinces in central Mindanao (Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur) and those in the Sulu archipelago (Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi), as well as within these socio-cultural clusters. It also applies to people, namely the Muslims of the southern Philippines, comprising thirteen different ethno-linguistical discourse. groups that converted to Islam before Spanish colonisation. But lingering issues cast a shadow over these developments: the region's indigenous minority continues to experience displacement, people from the sulu archipelago feel they are not getting the attention they deserve from the regional authorities and the ex-rebels' relationship with influential clans is tumultuous. While the parliamentary appointments reflect the Bangsamoro's political realities, donors could also build on the experiences of the UN Insider Mediators platform - which helped bring civil society and the MILF together in the run-up to the Organic's Law's passage - to create a loose network of individuals trained in mediation. This last category is particularly concerning in the Teduray-Lambangian and Manobo areas of Maguindanao. Not uncommon before the transition, violence often revolves around Moro encroachment on indigenous ancestral domain, including land grabs, and premeditated killings of tribal leaders. Other incidents include clashes between Moro Maguindanaons (sometimes reinforced by individual MILF members or other armed groups) on one side and Tedurays (in particular) on the other. Family ties are a staple of Bangsamoro governance, with clans exerting power by dominating entire towns or provinces and the local governments. Loyalties to both political leaders and armed groups are often bred at home. Class relations also matter: a handful of actors dominate each province's political leaders and armed groups are often economically and politically on the fringe. Meanwhile, members of Bangsamoro's aristocratic class, men and women alike, still have prestige with the population. Except for land conflicts in South Upi, violence does not affect the Christian settlers who live alongside Moros in Cotabato City and elsewhere in the Bangsamoro. The Church and Christian leaders supported the peace process, but recognise that decades of violence have produced certain biases and grievances among both Moros and Christians that are difficult to overcome. In the BARMM, the Office of Settler Communities, attached to the chief minister's office, represents Bangsamoro's Christians. Yet despite the specificities of women's experiences and needs amid violence, authorities can sometimes focus primarily or exclusively on men. For example, a human rights activist from Maguindanao who interviewed relatives of victims of military mortars commented that local authorities and media alike spoke only to men after the incident, ignoring female witnesses: "Where is the story of the mother? The peace process and the transition have provided more opportunities for women to learn about, and engage in, conflict resolution at both the regional and local levels. Donors should join hands with interim authorities to ensure that self-rule delivers for all the area's residents. Share Save Print Download PDF Full Report (en) What's new? Three years into the transition period in the newly autonomous Bangsamoro region, the peace process in the southern Philippines has made underliable progress. To further imbue the peace agreement's references to the "meaningful participation" of women with substance, the interim government could take several steps. To further strengthen inclusive peace and development, the interim government could take several steps. affecting indigenous peoples. Historically complicated relations between Maguindanaons and Tedurays in the area, as well as dynamics related to elections, worsen competing individual and communal land claims. In addition, gender sensitivity trainings for the BARMM's administration could allow for a more informed conversation on how to strike a balance between patriarchal reservations and the peace process's aspirations to address the needs of Bangsamoro women. Providing women from the interim government and civil society a joint platform to discuss policy initiatives, perhaps as a "women's caucus" in the parliament, could also be a way to institutionalise women's participation. Moro and indigenous women have not only borne much of the human cost of conflict in Mindanao, ... International actors also have a role to play in supporting inclusive policies in the Bangsamoro, though they should let local actors guide them in setting an achievable agenda. Now [that the extension has been granted], they forget about us". First of these is a genuine recognition of minority rights, as their denial or a failure to respect them may not only cause disillusionment but could even contribute to conflict, especially among the indigenous peoples in Maguindanao. Secondly, the interim government needs to develop trust with local actors whose interests are often aligned with clans seeking to preserve power and cut across ethnic lines. Intra-Moro conflict can turn deadly as a result of clan feuding; moreover, there is a broader danger that political differences between and among Moro elites and political differences between and elites and elit process, especially when there is no clear consensus on what it entails. Overall, however, prevailing patriarchal norms have on the whole endured. While the former rebels have started work on long-awaited development projects across the region, the efficacy of their interventions is hard to measure, particularly when it comes to the mainland-island divide. In the first year of the transition, the budget allocated to the island provinces was much lower than those for Maguindanao and Lanao, but the BARMM's technocrats have since attempted to narrow the gap. Moreover, the interim government has clearly made efforts to carry out more projects on the island provinces, saying they have a sense of "being left behind". One such mechanism is the Camp Transformation Task Force, in which the Tedurays have one representative for each camp. First, Bangsamoro remains socially patriarchal and traditional ideas about gender relations prevail. It is hard to carry out the inclusion agenda in these circumstances. The parliament also demonstrates that even a nominally inclusive governing body fulfilling a peace treaty's terms will not always advance protections for the rights and aspiration is also imperative, not only through representation in steering bodies, but also in decision-making on land use and livelihood projects in or near Camps Badre and Omar. Meanwhile, international donors backing the peace process should join hands to identify gaps in development across the region in order to better coverage. In addition to realising the aspirations of the majority-Muslim population while respecting the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, the Bangsamoro peace process set out to ensure women's "meaningful" participation, the Organic Law, introduced three goals for the peace process in this regard: first, women's participation in the Bangsamoro parliament and government; secondly, an interim government that would "uphold and protect" women's fundamental rights; and thirdly, women's fundamental rights; and thirdly, women's fundamental rights; and thirdly are conclusion in development, including the normalisation program. While the 2014 peace treaty itself was abstract regarding these objectives, the Organic Law was more concrete, for example contemplating that at least one woman would sit in the Bangsamoro cabinet and one woman in the parliament. A Maranao observer said female MILF members have things to say about camp management but "have been denied this opportunity". Livelihood trainings organised in some camps under the umbrella of government-MILF normalisation mechanisms, for example, sometimes fail to include women, leaving non-governmental organisations to fill the gap. Women's particular requirements, such as livelihoods for woman-headed households or health needs, are also not always included in needs assessments. MILF women, as a result, see normalisation as bristling with challenges, from program design to participation. Other initiatives could include workshops on disaster preparedness, places for women on local development councils and jobs for women as community peacekeepers. Secondly, ministries and members of parliament should consult more with women from all social strata about drafting the remaining priority codes and future laws with the help of civil society and village officials. Planners should also be attentive to women's specific needs in, for example, planning for Marawi's rehabilitation and providing services for jailed, displaced and orphaned women and girls. guickly spread to involve members of MILF, its predecessor group and non-Moro paramilitaries who supported their kin. Three years into the transition, the ex-rebels of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) who head the region's interim government have made headway but are still struggling against the backdrop of a fractured region divided along ethnic, kinship and class lines. Ending the Moro conflict took decades. In addition, the interim government should exert stronger efforts to resolve conflict affecting indigenous peoples in Maguindanao. Overall, the Bangsamoro peace process has been making progress. Some Moro and Teduray civilians cannot return to their farmland due to insecurity or occupation from the other side, while others live in constant fear of renewed violence. Making normalisation more inclusive could also help address grievances by giving people in Mindanao an opportunity to benefit more evenly from the anticipated peace dividends. The interim government's efforts to more equitably distribute peace dividends across sub-regions are laudable, but the region's governance does not yet appear to make the Bangsamoro's political economy more inclusive. Also called "settlers", most of the Bangsamoro's political economy more inclusive. over land-related disputes, the peace process has eased tensions. Discussions about the peace agreement in Christian and mixed communities in the lead-up to the BARMM of 63 Moro-majority villages carved out of Cotabato province, a former hotspot of interethnic conflict, all contributed to the equilibrium. Former political adversaries in majority-Christian areas adjacent to the BARMM now support the transition, and local flashpoints for communal strife, such as Pikit, Midsayap or Aleosan towns, have calmed. representatives from all Moro and indigenous communities, including civil society organisations. Women working in parliament or in the regional bureaucracy tend to have a more positive perspective on the progress made toward participation than those who are outside the system. critical in their assessment. Views are not monolithic among either group of women, however. [The interim government] should pass the gender and development code. Launched in 2019, the transition is proceeding along two overlapping but separate tracks. exact scope of women's participation. The [Bangsamoro] peace process aims to deliver durable peace ... to all of the region's residents, irrespective of their religious and ethnic identify, or their gender. Manila/Brussels, 18 February 2022 The Tausug people have a strong historical identification with Sulu province's political ancestor, the Sulu Sultanate. Although locals on the islands may belong to different ethnicities and even speak different languages, they often highlight their "common predicament" of dealing with the Cotabato-based regional government run by Maguindanaons or Maranaos. Meanwhile, the provinces of Lanao and Maguindanao, although next to each other, also developed along different trajectories with distinct languages, political cultures and social norms. Regional fissures have also fed into the Moro separatist movements. The interim government is also aiming to pass a gender and development code, which seeks to ensure the compliance of BARMM ministries and agencies with a Philippine law that requires 5 per cent of all government agencies' budgets to be spent on gender-related programs. Many women from the MILF and civil society support the draft legislation, which they deem stronger than a previous version as it provides for a monitoring mechanism and sanctions in cases of non-compliance. An observer lamented that "the farther you are away [from Cotabato City, BARMM's seat] the more confused you are" about what the interim government's responsibilities and modus operandi are. The latter have in places organised themselves to fight back, sometimes calling on the government to mobilise local paramilitary support. The political track requires the ex-rebels to build institutions by crafting priority legislation, staffing a civil service and getting governance in shape. The interim government should seek to overcome these challenges and develop policies that serve all Bangsamoro people. Reconciling all these parameters in the first years of the transition has not been easy, leading to differing perceptions of the interim administration's efforts to work toward greater inclusivity. With the MILF's Central Committee and other political-military structures intact, and dominated by former male combatants and religious leaders, some critics argue that overly centralised and opaque decision-making still prevails in the movement, and by extension, in the way it operates in government. Those sympathetic to the ex-rebels, however, point out that political transitions are by definition delicate, all the more so in a polity as fragmented as the Bangsamoro. For example, MILF chief negotiator Mohagher Igbal, supported by several former civil society activists, oversees the education portfolio, focusing on efforts to revamp the moribund state of schooling in the region. Iqbal retained several bureaucrats from the preceding administration in his office, including islanders, and is seen across the aisle as an effective administration. Raissa Jajurie, a Tausug lawyer and former activist, heads the social services and development ministry, which has made efforts to extend its outreach to the Bangsamoro's fringes, particularly during the pandemic. A special committee on Maranao lawyer Anna Basman, is looking into supporting the town's rehabilitation, the slow pace of which has dented the interim government's image among some Maranaos, who are already critical of their perceived underrepresentation in its ranks. Bangsamoro women, who were disproportionately affected by the armed conflict, are now better represented but still far from having the "meaningful political participation" the 2014 peace agreement promised them. MILF cadres and their families, in project planning and implementation under the normalisation bodies. Programs that provide much-needed assistance to particularly vulnerable people, like the housing support that the BARMM and Tawi-Tawi's provincial government directed toward the indigenous Badjao, should also be expanded. Creating sub-offices of vital ministries in Bongao, Lamitan and Jolo could be another way to show the regional government's commitment to the more remote parts of the region. In addition, the interim government's ministries, and perhaps even parliament, could on occasion conduct meetings in the island provinces instead of the regional capital of Cotabato. In its first three years in office, the interim government has made efforts to include women in policymaking. From the rebel movement's perspective, the temptation is naturally to favour its base of supporters, which mostly lives in central Mindanao and has high expectations of peace dividends. Doing so would help achieve the vision laid out in the peace agreements: a Bangsamoro that enjoys good governance, a region where men and women from all quarters can participate in building a more peaceful future. In October 2021, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte extended the interim government's term for three years, postponing the first Bangsamoro regional parliamentary polls to 2025. The so-called normalisation track foresees phased disarmament of guerrillas, in exchange for financial support, and transformation of rebel camps into "productive communities". The regional authorities overarching objective of raising the level of human development across the Bangsamoro relies on some key institutions, in which the interim government has made efforts to ensure a level of diversity. The regional government's efforts to support indigenous communities have been patchy in other respects. But as leader of the transition authority, the MILF needs to look beyond its political-military identity. In 2019 and 2020, conflicts between families from the two communities were rampant in the villages of San Jose, Itaw, Kuya and Lamud, as well as neighbouring hamlets. Lastly, the parties should keep faith with the commitment to meaningful participation of women in the political process, as contemplated in the 2014 peace treaty. Equity is certainly one reason but not the only one. In 2018, four years after the parties concluded the second of two landmark peace agreements, the Philippine Congress passed legislation known as the Bangsamoro Organic Law. Indigenous peoples, however, are determined to assert their rights, and worked to transfer the ancestral domain issue in central Mindanao to the Intergovernmental Relations Body, where representatives of the transition authority and national government officials tasked with indigenous affairs are now looking into the case. In November 2021, both signed a memorandum of cooperation that aims to establish a common vision "to promote the well-being" of indigenous leaders from the BARMM value the continuing dialogue; others criticise the "slow and irregular" schedule of talks. But the interim government, led by the ex-rebels of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, needs to work on delivering a more inclusive peace. The interim government should redouble efforts to territory, for one, namely the autonomous region comprising two provinces in central Mindanao (Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur), three provinces in the Sulu archipelago (Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi), two cities (Cotabato and Marawi) and one so-called Special Geographic Area (encompassing 63 villages). The prolongation of the transitional Authority for the next three years. Here, the Philippine government needs to fast-track the camp transformation program and delivery of socio-economic packages to ex-combatants, including those in camps and towns in western Mindanao. In one case, female village officials from Lanao attended trainings on budgeting and finance provided by local authorities, but then some received "instructions" from their husbands on how to allocate revenue. Secondly, women remain underrepresented in some regional ministries and local governments in the BARMM. Thirdly, given that swathes of Teduray-Lambangian ancestral land overlap with MILF Camps Badre and Omar, mechanisms through which indigenous peoples can articulate their concerns are needed to demonstrate the normalisation process's respect for indigenous rights and to avoid misunderstandings that could lead to renewed violence. Notwithstanding these achievements, challenges remain. The ex-rebels must find a way to satisfy their cadres and supporters without alienating the rest of the Bangsamoro in the process. Report 322 / Asia 18 February 2022 The peace process in the Bangsamoro, the newly autonomous region in the southern Philippines, is making progress. While many educated women are aware of the peace deal's intricacies and the possibilities it opens up for women, others appear to be less optimistic given the "realities" on the ground". An activist who works closely with MILF women said: "For most, peace means food on the table, security on the street and access to public health". The Bangsamoro government also needs to build more trust with the region's indigenous peoples. Manila/Brussels, 18 February 2022 March 2022 marks the third anniversary of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), a self-governing entity spread across the southernmost Philippine island of Mindanao and the adjacent Sulu archipelago. Interim authorities should also consult more widely with both women and indigenous peoples about how government can meet their needs through legislation and policy implementation. The backdrop to these promises is that Moro and indigenous women have not only borne much of the human cost of conflict in Mindanao, including violence, displacement and economic hardship, but also actively participated in conflict in varied ways, be it as part of rebel forces, as members of civil society organisations or as part of the region's past bureaucracies. As the Mindanao fighting went on, women took up different roles, including as community leaders in areas affected by militant attacks, local officials dealing with clan conflict or advocates for indigenous rights. The region's fragmentation along ethno-linguistic, kinship and class lines makes an inclusive approach both necessary and complicated. Flare-ups of violence ... Powerful families, and to an extent the "new economic elites" that have emerged during the transition, dominate business, industry and resource extraction. In Maguindanao, for example, indigenous Tedurays in Datu Blah municipality live in relative peace but "suffer in silence", as the ruling clan monopolises the town's economy. Talking about the province's rural villages, a Moro human rights activist said most poor communities remain "at the margins" both politically and economically. And while there has been a nominal upsurge of investments, mainly local but also international, results in terms of jobs are not yet tangible. Some observers have warned that should indigenous peoples and Moro farmers continue to be economically disenfranchised, violence, whether criminal or political, could be in the offing. It should also work harder to broaden participation in the transition. In the Sulu archipelago, it should establish ministerial sub-offices to strengthen its presence and better engage at the local level. National Tsing Hua University (NTHU)Study the evolution of intimacy in the context of global capitalism and probe the intersections of sex, love, labour and mobility. The peace process promised to satisfy the aspirations of the region's majority-Muslim population, respect minority rights and ensure meaningful women's political representation. Meanwhile, the interim government should go beyond existing stopgap arrangements and seek longer-term solutions to proactively resolve local land conflicts, particularly in South Upi. To this end, it should develop, in collaboration with local governments, an inventory of competing land claims in affected

villages, categorise them according to complexity and begin working through the least difficult first. Declaring all indigenous peoples the foremost right to land ownership and use through land titles, is not realistic in the short term, as it would clash with legitimate Moro land claims. A more promising near-term option is to safeguard indigenous rights through legislation that offers formal legal recognition of non-Moro indigenous rights through legislation that support women's and minorities' participation in civic and political life. Relevant interim government ministries will also need to take more concerted action to bring fighting to an end. While the Organic Law officially acceded to that demand, many indigenous communities, such as the Teduray, are still concerned about their future in the BARMM, demanding recognition of non-Moro indigenous identity that goes beyond formal assurances, including through legislation. Another central domain. The region's nascent institutions, bureaucratic machinery and legislation are also getting into shape. While women form an active part of the Moro rebel movement, the male-dominated nature of normalisation bodies and processes has meant that their perspectives have at times been neglected. Should it do so, it should work together with the MILF leadership to increase the proportion of female and indigenous representatives and nominate parliamentarians from smaller More ethno-linguistic groups. It could address the issue by outlining ownership of contested land, developing clear roadmaps to resolve the conflicting claims and ensuring comprehensive buy-in through consultations with Christian, More and indigenous leaders. Deadly conflict in the Bangsamoro has considerably decreased since the autonomous region came into being, but flare-ups still occur. For their part, indigenous leaders should address their grievances non-violently, for example by continuing to register these in outreach to Bangsamoro authorities and documenting human rights abuses or other actions against them or their property. Local civil society, including women's organisations, could also contribute to conflict resolution initiatives, particularly as they have a track record in managing community-based conflict in South Upi. The MILF, which is strongest in central Mindanao, mostly comprises Iranun, Maguindanaon and Maranao fighters. The Tausug, on the other hand, dominate the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the first Moro rebel movement, which has a strong presence in the islands. With the interim government's term now extended for another three years, selecting the next set of Bangsamoro parliamentarians could also provide a welcome opportunity to reinvigorate inclusive governance. As for local peacebuilding efforts, Bangsamoro women often play an active role, participating alongside men in efforts to defuse community conflicts and limit violence. Traditionally, for example, Maranao women from royalty or the political elite have acted as intermediaries or arbiters in clan feuds. women to help shape the new autonomous region. Despite the specificities of women's experiences and needs amid violence, authorities can sometimes focus primarily or exclusively on men. A few months into the transition, the lawmakers went as far as to issue a resolution that encouraged the national indigenous peoples' commission to "cease and desist" from land surveys in Maguindanao that could help the Teduray-Lambangian assert their ancestral domain. Even if it was not binding as a matter of law, the resolution raised questions about the ways in which the MILF-led interim government looks at minority rights in the Moro-majority region. The autonomous region is the product of nearly six decades of armed struggle between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Mindanao's largest rebel group. Two types of organised violence remain prevalent in the Bangsamoro. Those who hold positions are usually either from an "elite" background, have family ties "as daughters or wives" of rebel commanders. or politicians, or have proven their lovalty to the MILF before or during the transition. Thirdly, despite many interventions, whether by the women's voices are reaching "the strategic level" of decision-making, making the true effects of their participation hard to gauge. Insecurity has also driven Teduray villagers to join local communist bands for the sake of protection and access to guns. The new generation would benefit from deeper knowledge of peace efforts and the emerging political order, as it will better prepare them to be effective leaders in the future. help address grievances by giving people in Mindanao an opportunity to benefit more evenly from the anticipated peace dividends. The level of violence in the region is much lower today than it has been for decades, and as the transition gains momentum, peace dividends such as more efficient social or health services are slowly trickling down to the people. At the same time, despite its leading role in the interim government, the MILF is not synonymous with the parliament or the bureaucracy, making it difficult to place either blame or credit for the transition's twists and turns wholly with them. "We just want to live in peace", said an indigenous leader. The MILF is not synonymous with the parliament or the bureaucracy, making it difficult to place either blame or credit for the transition's twists and turns wholly with them. violence against indigenous peoples and sanction individuals who instigate or escalate attacks. Some Bangsamoro women say more representation could be "a boost" to visibility and, by extension, more gender-responsive policies. Others remain cautious, arguing that a stronger female presence in parliament would not necessarily lead to women having more influence or producing gender-sensitive policies. The creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in 2019 renewed hopes for peaceful coexistence between communities after decades of war in the southern Philippines. ensure long-term stability, as envisaged by the 2014 peace agreement. The Christians. In a region as diverse and fractured as the Bangsamoro, building institutions that properly represent and cater equally to all these groups is bound to be difficult. "It is mere tolerance, rather than acceptance", commented a development official working on normalisation. In the past, discontent with unequal distribution of peace dividends has undermined the cohesion of Moro movements to the point of splintering, which in turn fuelled conflict. The indigenous peoples (also known as Lumads). A good place to start might be to map out the competing land claims that are often the source of tension, rank them in order of complexity and begin working through the most straightforward first. In addition, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process has pledged to look into conflicting land claims that could hamper normalisation. But many Tedurays feel there are still no guarantees they will be heard, and some say the MILF, which plays a central role in camp transformation, are prone to adopt what they see as patronising attitudes. What women's "meaningful political participation" means in practice is still subject to debate in the Bangsamoro. For example, according to available data, while the region's overall poverty rate decreased in 2021, provincial indicators for development in Sulu and Tawi-Tawi stagnated. Worse is the limited role women are able to play in the transformation of MILF camps. Normalisation not only illustrates the transition's complexity, but its gaps also reflect Bangsamoro's fault lines and suggest that the process is less than fully inclusive. Many of the BARMM's ministers, for example, have their own power bases, political acumen and understanding of what it means "to be inclusive". The regional government's inconsistent relations with local government's inconsistent relations with local government's inconsistent relations with local governments, meanwhile, stem as much from inherent cracks in the Bangsamoro's ethno-political setup as from the former rebels' difficulties in coherently dealing with the clans that dominate the region's towns and provinces, as witnessed in the extension debate. Interim government officials, who may be experienced technocrats, neophytes or anything in between, also navigate the political transition differently. Historically, liberation movements in the region emphasised "Morohood" by invoking a common past shaped by resistance to colonial conquest, with Islam as the unifier. But regional fissures lingered from the Moro self-determination struggle's beginnings in the colonial era to the present. The protracted and meandering violence in Mindanao that escalated to a full-blown separatist insurgency in the early 1970s has exacerbated political fragmentation by shaking up traditional sources of authority and diffusing power among the national government, local politicians and insurgents. Thirdly, the ex-rebels must find a way to satisfy their cadres and supporters without alienating the rest of the Bangsamoro in the process. The MILF should encourage its local commanders to refrain from violence and to use their kinship networks to persuade other armed actors to stand down as well. First, it should pass the gender and development code, which requires gender sensitivity in BARMM agencies and local government units should use their existing budgets for interventions that promote women's participation in peace and development programs beyond activities such as cultural events that some see as tokenistic. The MILF, as the party in the driver's seat of the transition. While President Duterte appointed the transition process, is well aware of the need to foster an inclusive transition. elect the region's chief minister or top executive. Donors should support the regional authorities and local civil society organisations in working toward these objectives and addressing existing development gaps. Armed groups and powerful political clans also continue to shape the socio-political order in the BARMM's five provinces, two cities and one special administrative area that together are home to around 4.5 million people. Working with local civil society, including through provision of funding, particularly with organisations focused on indigenous groups and islanders, as well as women leaders, could be another way to support higher levels of civic participation and a richer political lifetonic policies. for these people. The office's creation, while delayed, is a first step for the community to become "more active in governance". A crucial task for the former rebels in achieving durable peace is to tackle local violence and reduce the potential for conflict flare-ups, especially in or near indigenous communities. Making normalisation more inclusive could ... The BARMM's ministries - such as those of indigenous peoples' affairs, of public order and safety, of environment, natural resources and energy - perhaps coming together in a special inter-agency task force, could spearhead these efforts. The interim government should also convene a series of inclusive discussions among the parties to the most protracted local conflicts as the first step toward developing tailored dispute resolution roadmaps for each. In South Upi, for example, it would need to secure the buy-in of local Moro leaders and commanders; indigenous representatives; and Christian political and business interests. Descendants of Catholic and Protestant settlers who migrated to Mindanao from other Philippine islands in previous centuries make up another minority. continue to occur, notwithstanding the overall decline of armed conflict in the region. The Bangsamoro's new institutions provide various platforms through which minority groups and Bangsamoro women can take part in the transition and influence policies Donors should also coordinate a comprehensive mapping of development and peacebuilding programs in the Bangsamoro and adjacent areas, to help eliminate redundancy and help ensure that investments are directed everywhere they are most needed. For example, starting in 2016, the UN Development Programme trained a number of Bangsamoro women and men as "insider mediators", who later became crucial actors in negotiating key provisions of the Organic Law with members of the Philippine Congress. During the last months of 2021, Maguindanaon and indigenous women created their own mediation network in Maguindanaon that accompanied the government-MILF ceasefire mechanism when it deployed on the ground in cases of violations. A local NGO led by a woman in Sulu province, Tumikang Sama Sama, has mediated feuds in the province even when the logistics became much more difficult during the pandemic. The label can also refer to Islamised members of the autonomous region's indigenous communities, though some indigenous groups have either maintained their traditional customs and religion, or embraced Christianity, and prefer to be called "non-Moro indigenous peoples". Several issues, however, continue to threaten the process. Finally, the Philippine government and the MILF should revive information drives on normalisation in MILF camps and indigenous communities, among other things to avoid false expectations and to promote transparency. They also point out that the MILF is the largest existing cross-regional force, and therefore carries more potential for an inclusive approach than any of the region's other political actors. Paradoxically, there are also rebels, both men and women, who feel that the organisation's revolutionary ideals are fading away, leaving them still loyal but disappointed and frustrated. Yet some women who spoke to Crisis Group said they feel "underutilised" by decision-makers, despite advantages that Bangsamoro women peacemakers typically have, such as safe access to conflicting parties during a feud's early stages (for example via back channels) and the ability to unpack conflict dynamics while being perceived as objective and non-partisan. To the extent that women are sidelined, locals suggest several possible explanations, including lack of awareness of the contributions women can make, the perception that conflict resolution is a man's job and women's underrepresentation in formal political positions, which in the Bangsamoro are crucial for bestowing legitimacy on potential mediators. In addition, women indicated that concerns for personal safety sometimes make them hesitant to intervene when violence escalates. The interim government responded with humanitarian measures such as timely relief assistance, but the drivers of violence remain. A major challenge appears to be the interim government's unwillingness to settle the conflicts in good faith, which would require disciplining MILF members, or followers of other Moro armed groups, and resolving competing land claims once and for all. But several groups, including minorities and women, could be better represented. Donors should keep supporting the interim government's administrative capacities through trainings and continue dialogue with the BARMM on the importance of women's political participation. Bangsamoro's broader war-to-peace transition, commonly referred to as the "normalisation process", has also been a mixed bag. Before the pandemic, the third-party Independent Decommissioning Body disarmed over 12,000 MILF guerrillas in two phases. From March 2020 onward, however, the process stalled, due to COVID-19 but also because of the MILF's hesitancy to disarm, given the uncertainty regarding an extension of the transition period at the time and doubts about the central government's capacity to deliver the socio-economic package it promised to demobilised combatants. The third phase of decommissioning finally resumed in November 2021, once the extension had been announced; it aims to disarm as many as 14,000 more guerrillas in the coming months. Bangsamoro's cultural and religious diversity means that there is no single, homogeneous set of expectations as to women's roles. Violence subsided over the course of 2021, but the fragile stalemate is likely to be untenable

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